Precision Software Appli…tions Silver Collection 1/Precision Software Applications Silver Collection Volume One (PSM) (1993).iso/games/egavga/soviet.arj/AE2BKHUN.DOC

Text File | 1992-10-06 | 11KB | 207 lines

D.2.2

Letter of March 19, 1922, from Lenin via Molotov to members of
the Politburo, outlining a brutal plan of action against the "Black
Hundreds" clergy and their followers, who were defying the
government decree to remove church valuables (purported by the
government to be used to fund famine relief).  Lenin proposed the
arrest and quick trial of the insurrectionists in Shuia, followed by a
ruthless campaign to shoot a large number of the reactionary clergy
and bourgeoisie and urged that removal of valuables from the
richest churches and monasteries be finished quickly.





Copy To Comrade Molotov
Top Secret For members of the Politburo
member of the Politburo (incl. Comrade Kalinin)
should comment directly on the document.
Lenin.

        In regard to the occurrence at Shuia, which is already slated
for discussion by the Polituro, it is necessary right now to make a
firm decision about a general plan of action in the present course.
Because I doubt that I will be able to attend the Politburo meeting
on March 20th in person, I will set down my thoughts in writing.

        The event at Shuia should be connected with the
announcement that the Russian News Agency [ROST] recently sent
to the newspapers but that was not for publication, namely, the
announcement that the Black Hundreds in Petrograd [Piter] were
preparing to defy the decree on the removal of property of value
from the churches.  If this fact is compared with what the papers
report about the attitude of the clergy to the decree on the removal
of church property in addition to what we know about the illegal
proclamation of Patriarch Tikhon, then it becomes perfectly clear
that the Black Hundreds clergy, headed by its leader, with full
deliberation is carrying out a plan at this very moment to destroy
us decisively.

        It is obvious that the most influential group of the Black
Hundreds clergy conceived this plan in secret meetings and that it
was accepted with sufficient resolution.  The events in Shuia is only
one manifestation and actualization of this general plan.

        I think that here our opponent is making a huge strategic
error by attempting to draw us into a decisive struggle now when it
is especially hopeless and especially disadvantageous to him.  For
us, on the other hand, precisely at the present moment we are
presented with an exceptionally favorable, even unique, opportunity
when we can in 99 out of 100 chances utterly defeat our enemy
with complete success and guarantee for ourselves the position we
require for decades.  Now and only now, when people are being
eaten in famine-stricken areas, and hundreds, if not thousands, of
corpses lie on the roads, we can (and therefore must) pursue the
removal of church property with the most frenzied and ruthless
energy and not hesitate to put down the least opposition.  Now and
only now, the vast majority of peasants will either be on our side,
or at least will not be in a position to support to any decisive
degree this handful of Black Hundreds clergy and reactionary urban
petty bourgeoisie, who are willing and able to attempt to oppose
this Soviet decree with a policy of force.


        We must pursue the removal of church property by any
means necessary in order to secure for ourselves a fund of several
hundred million gold rubles (do not forget the immense wealth of
some monasteries and lauras).  Without this fund any government
work in general, any economic build-up in particular, and any
upholding of soviet principles in Genoa especially is completely
unthinkable.  In order to get our hands on this fund of several
hundred million gold rubles (and perhaps even several hundred
billion), we must do whatever is necessary.  But to do this
successfully is possible only now.  All considerations indicate that
later on we will fail to do this, for no other time, besides that of
desperate famine, will give us such a mood among the general mass
of peasants that would ensure us the sympathy of this group, or, at
least, would ensure us the neutralization of this group in the sense
that victory in the struggle for the removal of church property
unquestionably and completely will be on our side.

        One clever writer on statecraft correctly said that if it is
necessary for the realization of a well-known political goal to
perform a series of brutal actions then it is necessary to do them in
the most energetic manner and in the shortest time, because masses
of people will not tolerate the protracted use of brutality. This
observation in particular is further strengthened because harsh
measures against a reactionary clergy will be politically impractical,
possibly even extremely dangerous as a result of the international
situation in which we in Russia, in all probability, will find
ourselves, or may find ourselves, after Genoa.  Now victory over
the reactionary clergy is assured us completely.  In addition, it will
be more difficult for the major part of our foreign adversaries
among the Russian emigres abroad, i.e., the Socialist-
Revolutionaries and the Milyukovites [Left Wing Cadet Party], to
fight against us if we, precisely at this time, precisely in connection
with the famine, suppress the reactionary clergy with utmost haste
and ruthlessness.

        Therefore, I come to the indisputable conclusion that we
must precisely now smash the Black Hundreds clergy most
decisively and ruthlessly and put down all resistance with such
brutality that they will not forget it for several decades.

        The campaign itself for carrying out this plan I envision in
the following manner:

        Only Comrade Kalinin should appear officially in regard to
any measures taken--never and under no circumstance must
Comrade Trotsky write anything for the press or in any other way
appear before the public.

        The telegram  already issued in the name of the Politburo
about the temporary suspension of removals must not be rescinded.
It is useful for us because it gives our adversary the impression that
we are vacillating, that he has succeeded in confusing us (our
adversary, of course, will quickly find out about this secret
telegram precisely because it is secret).

        Send to Shuia one of the most energetic, clear-headed, and
capable members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee
[VTsIK] or some other representative of the central government
(one is better than several), giving him verbal instructions through
one of the members of the Politburo.  The instructions must come
down to this, that in Shuia he must arrest more if possible but not
less than several dozen representatives of the local clergy, the local
petty bourgeoisie, and the local bourgeoisie on suspicion of direct
or indirect participation in the forcible resistance to the decree of
the VTsIK on the removal of property of value from churches.
Immediately upon completion of this task, he must return to
Moscow and personally deliver a report to the full session of the
Politburo or to two specially authorized members of the Politburo.
On the basis of this report, the Politburo will give a detailed
directive to the judicial authorities, also verbal, that the trial of the
insurrectionists from Shuia, for opposing aid to the starving, should
be carried out in utmost haste and should end not other than with
the shooting of the very largest number of the most influential and
dangerous of the Black Hundreds in Shuia, and, if possible, not
only in this city but even in Moscow and several other ecclesiastical
centers.

        I think that it is advisable for us not to touch Patriarch
Tikhon himself, even though he undoubtedly headed this whole
revolt of slave-holders.  Concerning him, the State Political
Administration [GPU] must be given a secret directive that
precisely at this time all communications of this personage must be
monitored and their contents disclosed in all possible accuracy and
detail.  Require Dzerzhinsky and Unshlikht personally to report to
the Politburo about this weekly.

        At the party congress arrange a secret meeting of all or
almost all delegates to discuss this matter jointly with the chief
workers of the GPU, the People's Commissariat of Justice [NKIu],
and the Revolutionary Tribunal.  At this meeting pass a secret
resolution of the congress that the removal of property of value,
especially from the very richest lauras, monasteries, and churches,
must be carried out with ruthless resolution, leaving nothing in
doubt, and in the very shortest time.  The greater the number of
representatives of the reactionary clergy and the reactionary
bourgeoisie that we succeed in shooting on this occasion, the better
because this "audience" must precisely now be taught a lesson in
such a way that they will not dare to think about any resistance
whatsoever for several decades.

        To attend to the quickest and most successful carrying out of
these measures, there at the congress, i.e., at the secret meeting,
appoint a special commission, the participation of Comrade Trotsky
and Comrade Kalinin being required, without giving any publicity
to this commission, with the purpose that the subordination to it of
all operations would be provided for and carried out not in the
name of the commission but as an all-soviet and all-party order.
Appoint those who are especially responsible from among the best
workers to carry out these measures in the wealthiest lauras,
monasteries, and churches.

                                                 Lenin.

March 19, 1922.

        I request that Comrade Molotov attempt to circulate this
letter to the members of the Politburo by evening today (not
making copies) and ask them to return it to the secretary
immediately after reading it, with a succinct note regarding
whether each member of the Politburo agrees in principle or if the
letter arouses any differences of opinion.

                                                 Lenin.



        A note in the hand of Comrade Molotov:

        "Agreed.  However, I propose to extend the campaign not to
all gubernias and cities, but to those where indeed there are
considerable possessions of value, accordingly concentrating the
forces and attention of the party.

March 19.  Molotov."



        True copy: [illegible]


        The original has been transferred to the Lenin Institute.